Weapons handling and associated tactical proficiency, however, are now beyond their control. Commanding officers are ultimately responsible for the combat readiness of their commands. This solution alone, however, severely limits the levels of sustainable combat effectiveness that can be achieved, specifically in the anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) and maritime interception operation warfare areas. The use of outside sources has, to this point, probably been the only way to provide training of any substance to the Fleet. After up to six weeks of dedicated weapons training, this is completely unsatisfactory and demands that training methods be improved. Time and again, I have taken sailors to the range who have recently been through every Navy weapons training program available only to discover that they do not even have a consistent grip and are unable to effectively present the weapon to fire a round. Another example is the decision that sailors will not be taught "failure to stop" and "high percentage" shot placement procedures.Īs an instructor, I have found quite often that the content and methodology of the training curriculum is counter-productive to safe and effective tactical weapons employment. For example, when I arrived at SSEW, I was informed that we would not be handling weapons during the first day of training, essentially losing 20% of our training time. Third is the antiquated content and methodology used throughout Navy training programs.įirst, the issues of content and methodology: the Navy is not using effective methods to train, nor is it using combateffective techniques. second is the sole dependence on using outside sources to conduct smallarms training at the Armed Sentry Course (ASC) and Shipboard security Engagement Weapons (SSEW) school. First is the lack of knowledge, specifically among small arms marksmanship instructors (SAMI) and commanding officers. Three issues contribute to the continuing lack of small-arms proficiency in the Fleet. Important steps have been taken in this direction, but if combat effective proficiency is to be reached, additional efforts are needed. It must now start training beyond simply avoiding safety mishaps and begin pushing toward combat effectiveness.
The Navy's small arms training program has undergone vast improvement over the last five years.
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